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One view of speech perception is that acoustic signals are transformed into
representations for pattern matching to determine linguistic structure. This process can
be taken as a statistical pattern-matching problem, assuming realtively stable linguistic
categories are characterized by neural representations related to auditory properties of
speech that can be compared to speech input. This kind of pattern matching can be
termed a passive process which implies rigidity of processing with few demands on
cognitive processing. An alternative view is that speech recognition, even in early stages,
is an active process in which speech analysis is attentionally guided. Note that this does
not mean consciously guided but that information-contingent changes in early auditory
encoding can occur as a function of context and experience. Active processing assumes
that attention, plasticity, and listening goals are important in considering how listeners
cope with adverse circumstances that impair hearing by masking noise in the environment
or hearing loss. Although theories of speech perception have begun to incorporate some
active processing, they seldom treat early speech encoding as plastic and attentionally
guided. Recent research has suggested that speech perception is the product of both
feedforward and feedback interactions between a number of brain regions that include
descending projections perhaps as far downstream as the cochlea. It is important to
understand how the ambiguity of the speech signal and constraints of context dynamically
determine cognitive resources recruited during perception including focused attention,
learning, and working memory. Theories of speech perception need to go beyond the
current corticocentric approach in order to account for the intrinsic dynamics of the
auditory encoding of speech. In doing so, this may provide new insights into ways in which
hearing disorders and loss may be treated either through augementation or therapy.
Keywords: speech, perception, attention, learning, active processing, theories of speech perception, passive
processing
In order to achieve flexibility and generativity, spoken language
understanding depends on active cognitive processing (Nusbaum
and Schwab, 1986; Nusbaum and Magnuson, 1997). Active cog-
nitive processing is contrasted with passive processing in terms
of the control processes that organize the nature and sequence
of cognitive operations (Nusbaum and Schwab, 1986). A passive
process is one in which inputs map directly to outputs with no
hypothesis testing or information-contingent operations. Autom-
atized cognitive systems (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) behave
as though passive, in that stimuli are mandatorily mapped onto
responses without demand on cognitive resources. However it is
important to note that cognitive automatization does not have
strong implications for the nature of the mediating control system
such that various different mechanisms have been proposed to
account for automatic processing (e.g., Logan, 1988). By com-
parison, active cognitive systems however have a control structure
that permits “information contingent processing” or the ability
to change the sequence or nature of processing in the context
of new information or uncertainty. In principle, active systems
can generate hypotheses to be tested as new information arrives
or is derived (Nusbaum and Schwab, 1986) and thus provide
substantial cognitive flexibility to respond to novel situations and
demands.
ACTIVE AND PASSIVE PROCESSES
The distinction between active and passive processes comes from
control theory and reflects the degree to which a sequence of
operations, in this case neural population responses, is contingent
on processing outcomes (see Nusbaum and Schwab, 1986). A
passive process is an open loop sequence of transformations that
are fixed, such that there is an invariant mapping from input
to output (MacKay, 1951, 1956). Figure 1A illustrates a passive
process in which a pattern of inputs (e.g., basilar membrane
responses) is transmitted directly over the eighth nerve to the
next population of neurons (e.g., in the auditory brainstem)
and upward to cortex. This is the fundamental assumption of
a number of theories of auditory processing in which a fixed
cascade of neural population responses are transmitted from one
part of the brain to the other (e.g., Barlow, 1961). This type
of system operates the way reflexes are assumed to operate in
which neural responses are transmitted and presumably trans-
formed but in a fixed and immutable way (outside the context
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of passive and active processes.
The top panel (A) represents a passive process. A stimulus presented to
sensory receptors is transformed through a series of processes (Ti) into a
sequence of pattern representations until a final perceptual representation is
the result. This could be thought of as a pattern of hair cell stimulation being
transformed up to a phonological representation in cortex. The middle panel
(B) represents a top-down active process. Sensory stimulation is compared
as a pattern to hypothesized patterns derived from some knowledge source
either derived from context or expectations. Error signals from the
comparison interact with the hypothesized patterns until constrained to a
single interpretation. The generation of hypothesized patterns may be in
parallel or accomplished sequentially. The bottom panel (C) represents a
bottom-up active process in which sensory stimulation is transformed into an
initial pattern, which can be transformed into some representation. If this
representation is sensitive to the unfolding of context or immediate
perceptual experience, it could generate a pattern from the immediate input
and context that is different than the initial pattern. Feedback from the
context-based pattern in comparison with the initial pattern can generate an
error signal to the representation changing how context is integrated to
produce a new pattern for comparison purposes.
of longer term reshaping of responses). Considered in this way,
such passive processing networks should process in a time frame
that is simply the sum of the neural response times, and should
not be influenced by processing outside this network, functioning
something like a module (Fodor, 1983). In this respect then,
such passive networks should operate “automatically” and not
place any demands on cognitive resources. Some purely auditory
theories seem to have this kind of organization (e.g., Fant, 1962;
Diehl et al., 2004) and some more classical neural models (e.g.,
Broca, 1865; Wernicke, 1874/1977; Lichtheim, 1885; Geschwind,
1970) appear to be organized this way. In these cases, auditory
processes project to perceptual interpretations with no clearly
specified role for feedback to modify or guide processing.
By contrast, active processes are variable in nature, as network
processing is adjusted by an error-correcting mechanism or
feedback loop. As such, outcomes may differ in different contexts.
These feedback loops provide information to correct or modify
processing in real time, rather than retrospectively. Nusbaum and
Schwab (1986) describe two different ways an active, feedback-
based system may be achieved. In one form, as illustrated
in Figure 1B, expectations (derived from context) provide a
hypothesis about a stimulus pattern that is being processed. In
this case, sensory patterns (e.g., basilar membrane responses) are
transmitted in much the same way as in a passive process (e.g.,
to the auditory brainstem). However, descending projections
may modify the nature of neural population responses in various
ways as a consequence of neural responses in cortical systems.
For example, top-down effects of knowledge or expectations have
been shown to alter low level processing in the auditory brainstem
(e.g., Galbraith and Arroyo, 1993) or in the cochlea (e.g., Giard
et al., 1994). Active systems may occur in another form, as
illustrated in Figure 1C. In this case, there may be a strong
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bottom-up processing path as in a passive system, but feedback
signals from higher cortical levels can change processing in real
time at lower levels (e.g., brainstem). An example of this would
be the kind of observation made by Spinelli and Pribram (1966)
in showing that electrical stimulation of the inferotemporal
cortex changed the receptive field structure for lateral geniculate
neurons or Moran and Desimone’s (1985) demonstration that
spatial attentional cueing changes effective receptive fields in
striate and extrastriate cortex. In either case, active processing
places demands on the system’s limited cognitive resources in
order to achieve cognitive and perceptual flexibility. In this sense,
active and passive processes differ in the cognitive and perceptual
demands they place on the system.
Although the distinction between active and passive processes
seems sufficiently simple, examination of computational models
of spoken word recognition makes the distinctions less clear. For
a very simple example of this potential issue consider the original
Cohort theory (Marslen-Wilson and Welsh, 1978). Activation of
a set of lexical candidates was presumed to occur automatically
from the initial sounds in a word. This can be designated as a
passive process since there is a direct invariant mapping from
initial sounds to activation of a lexical candidate set, i.e., a cohort
of words. Each subsequent sound in the input then deactivates
members of this candidate set giving the appearance of a recurrent
hypothesis testing mechanism in which the sequence of input
sounds deactivates cohort members. One might consider this an
active system overall with a passive first stage since the initial
cohort set constitutes a set of lexical hypotheses that are tested
by the use of context. However, it is important to note that the
original Cohort theory did not include any active processing at
the phonemic level, as hypothesis testing is carried out in the
context of word recognition. Similarly, the architecture of the
Distributed Cohort Model (Gaskell and Marslen-Wilson, 1997)
asserts that activation of phonetic features is accomplished by
a passive system whereas context interacts (through a hidden
layer) with the mapping of phonetic features onto higher order
linguistic units (phonemes and words) representing an inter-
action of context with passively derived phonetic features. In
neither case is the activation of the features or sound input
to linguistic categorization treated as hypothesis testing in the
context of other sounds or linguistic information. Thus, while
the Cohort models can be thought of as an active system for
the recognition of words (and sometimes phonemes), they treat
phonetic features as passively derived and not influenced from
context or expectations.
This is often the case in a number of word recognition models.
The Shortlist models (Shortlist: Norris, 1994; Shortlist B: Norris
and McQueen, 2008) assume that phoneme perception is a largely
passive process (at least it can be inferred as such by lack of any
specification in the alternative). While Shortlist B uses phoneme
confusion data (probability functions as input) and could in
principle adjust the confusion data based on experience (through
hypothesis testing and feedback), the nature of the derivation of
the phoneme confusions is not specified; in essence assuming
the problem of phoneme perception is solved. This appears to
be common to models (e.g., NAM, Luce and Pisoni, 1998) in
which the primary goal is to account for word perception rather
than phoneme perception. Similarly, the second Trace model
(McClelland and Elman, 1986) assumed phoneme perception was
passively achieved albeit with competition (not feedback to the
input level). It is interesting that the first Trace model (Elman
and McClelland, 1986) did allow for feedback from phonemes
to adjust activation patterns from acoustic-phonetic input, thus
providing an active mechanism. However, this was not carried
over into the revised version. This model was developed to
account for some aspects of phoneme perception unaccounted
for in the second model. It is interesting to note that the Hebb-
Trace model (Mirman et al., 2006a), while seeking to account for
aspects of lexical influence on phoneme perception and speaker
generalization did not incorporate active processing of the input
patterns. As such, just the classification of those inputs was
actively governed.
This can be understood in the context schema diagrammed
in Figure 1. Any process that maps inputs onto representations
in an invariant manner or that would be classified as a finite-
state deterministic system can be considered passive. A process
that changes the classification of inputs contingent on context or
goals or hypotheses can be considered an active system. Although
word recognition models may treat the recognition of words or
even phonemes as an active process, this active processing is not
typically extended down to lower levels of auditory processing.
These systems tend to operate as though there is a fixed set of
input features (e.g., phonetic features) and the classification of
such features takes place in a passive, automatized fashion.
By contrast, Elman and McClelland (1986) did describe
a version of Trace in which patterns of phoneme activation
actively changes processing at the feature input level. Similarly,
McClelland et al. (2006) described a version of their model
in which lexical information can modify input patterns at the
subphonemic level. Both of these models represent active sys-
tems for speech processing at the sublexical level. However, it
is important to point out that such theoretical propositions
remain controversial. McQueen et al. (2006) have argued that
there are no data to argue for lexical influences over sublexical
processing, although Mirman et al. (2006b) have countered this
with empirical arguments. However, the question of whether
there are top-down effects on speech perception is not the
same as asking if there are active processes governing speech
perception. Top-down effects assume higher level knowledge
constrains interpretations, but as indicated in Figure 1C, there
can be bottom-up active processing where by antecedent audi-
tory context constrains subsequent perception. This could be
carried out in a number of ways. As an example, Ladefoged
and Broadbent (1957) demonstrated that hearing a context sen-
tence produced by one vocal tract could shift the perception
of subsequent isolated vowels such that they would be consis-
tent with the vowel space of the putative speaker. Some have
accounted for this result by asserting there is an automatic
auditory tuning process that shifts perception of the subsequent
vowels (Huang and Holt, 2012; Laing et al., 2012). While the
behavioral data could possibly be accounted for by such a sim-
ple passive mechanism, it might also be the case the auditory
pattern input produces constraints on the possible vowel space
or auditory mappings that might be expected. In this sense, the
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question of whether early auditory processing of speech is an
active or passive process is still a point of open investigation and
discussion.
It is important to make three additional points in order to
clarify the distinction between active and passive processes. First,
a Bayesian mechanism is not on its own merits necessarily active
or passive. Bayes rule describes the way different statistics can
be used to estimate the probability of a diagnosis or classifica-
tion of an event or input. But this is essentially a computation
theoretic description much in the same way Fourier’s theorem is
independent of any implementation of the theorem to actually
decompose a signal into its spectrum (cf. Marr, 1982). The calcu-
lation and derivation of relevant statistics for a Bayesian inference
can be carried out passively or actively. Second, the presence of
learning within a system does not on its own merits confer active
processing status on a system. Learning can occur by a number
of algorithms (e.g., Hebbian learning) that can be implemented
passively. However to the extent that a system’s inputs are plastic
during processing, would suggest whether an active system is at
work. Finally, it is important to point out that active processing
describes the architecture of a system (the ability to modify
processing on the fly based on the processing itself) but not the
behavior at any particular point in time. Given a fixed context
and inputs, any active system can and likely would mimic passive
behavior. The detection of an active process therefore depends
on testing behavior under contextual variability or resource lim-
itations to observe changes in processing as a consequence of
variation in the hypothesized alternatives for interpretation (e.g.,
slower responses, higher error rate or confusions, increase in
working memory load).
COMPUTATIONAL NEED FOR ACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS IN
SPEECH PERCEPTION
Understanding how and why active cognitive processes are
involved in speech perception is fundamental to the development
of a theory of speech perception. Moreover, the nature of the
theoretical problems that challenge most explanations of speech
perception are structurally similar to some of the theoretical
issues in language comprehension when considered more broadly.
In addition to addressing the basis for language comprehension
broadly, to the extent that such mechanisms play a critical role
in spoken language processing, understanding their operation
may be important to understanding both the effect of hearing
loss on speech perception as well as suggesting ways of reme-
diating hearing loss. If one takes an overly simplified view of
hearing (and thus damage to hearing resulting in loss) as an
acoustic-to-neural signal transduction mechanism comparable
to a microphone-amplifier system, the simplifying assumptions
may be very misleading. The notion of the peripheral auditory
system as a passive acoustic transducer leads to theories that
postulate passive conversion of acoustic energy to neural signals
and this may underestimate both the complexity and potential
of the human auditory system for processing speech. At the
very least, early auditory encoding in the brain (reflected by the
auditory brainstem response) is conditioned by experience (Skoe
and Kraus, 2012) and so the distribution of auditory experiences
shapes the basic neural patterns extracted from acoustic signals.
However, it is appears that this auditory encoding is shaped from
the top-down under active and adaptive processing of higher-level
knowledge and attention (e.g., Nusbaum and Schwab, 1986; Strait
et al., 2010).
This conceptualization of speech perception as an active pro-
cess has large repercussions for understanding the nature of
hearing loss in older adults. Rabbitt (1991) has argued, as have
others, that older adults, compared with younger adults, must
employ additional perceptual and cognitive processing to offset
sensory deficits in frequency and temporal resolution as well as in
frequency range (Murphy et al., 2000; Pichora-Fuller and Souza,
2003; McCoy et al., 2005; Wingfield et al., 2005; Surprenant,
2007). Wingfield et al. (2005) have further argued that the use of
this extra processing at the sensory level is costly and may affect
the availability of cognitive resources that could be needed for
other kinds of processing. While these researchers consider the
cognitive consequences that may be encountered more generally
given the demands on cognitive resources, such as the deficits
found in the encoding of speech content in memory, there is
less consideration of the way these demands may impact speech
processing itself. If speech perception itself is mediated by active
processes, which require cognitive resources, then the increasing
demands on additional cognitive and perceptual processing for
older adults becomes more problematic. The competition for
cognitive resources may shortchange aspects of speech perception.
Additionally, the difference between a passive system that simply
involves the transduction, filtering, and simple pattern recogni-
tion (computing a distance between stored representations and
input patterns and selecting the closest fit) and an active sys-
tem that uses context dependent pattern recognition and signal-
contingent adaptive processing has implications for the nature of
augmentative hearing aids and programs of therapy for remediat-
ing aspects of hearing loss. It is well known that simple ampli-
fication systems are not sufficient remediation for hearing loss
because they amplify noise as well as signal. Understanding how
active processing operates and interacts with signal properties and
cognitive processing might lead to changes in the way hearing
aids operate, perhaps through cueing changes in attention, or by
modifying the signal structure to affect the population coding
of frequency information or attentional segregation of relevant
signals. Training to use such hearing aids might be more effective
by simple feedback or by systematically changing the level and
nature of environmental sound challenges presented to listeners.
Furthermore, understanding speech perception as an active
process has implications for explaining some of the findings of
the interaction of hearing loss with cognitive processes (e.g.,
Wingfield et al., 2005). One explanation of the demands on
cognitive mechanisms through hearing loss is a compensatory
model as noted above (e.g., Rabbitt, 1991). This suggests that
when sensory information is reduced, cognitive processes operate
inferentially to supplement or replace the missing information.
In many respects this is a kind of postperceptual explanation
that might be like a response bias. It suggests that mechanisms
outside of normal speech perception can be called on when
sensory information is degraded. However an alternative view
of the same situation is that it reflects the normal operation of
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speech recognition processing rather than an extra postperceptual
inference system. Hearing loss may specifically exacerbate the
fundamental problem of lack of invariance in acoustic-phonetic
relationships.
The fundamental problem faced by all theories of speech
perception derives from the lack of invariance in the relation-
ship between the acoustic patterns of speech and the linguistic
interpretation of those patterns. Although the many-to-many
mapping between acoustic patterns of speech and perceptual
interpretations is a longstanding well-known problem (e.g.,
Liberman et al., 1967), the core computational problem only
truly emerges when a particular pattern has many different
interpretations or can be classified in many different ways. It
is widely established that individuals are adept in understand-
ing the constituents of a given category, for traditional cate-
gories (Rosch et al., 1976) or ad hoc categories developed in
response to the demands of a situation (Barsalou, 1983). In
this sense, a many-to-one mapping does not pose a substantial
computational challenge. As Nusbaum and Magnuson (1997)
argue, a many-to-one mapping can be understood with a simple
class of deterministic computational mechanisms. In essence, a
deterministic system establishes one-to-one mappings between
inputs and outputs and thus can be computed by passive mech-
anisms such as feature detectors. It is important to note that a
many-to-one mapping (e.g., rising formant transitions signaling
a labial stop and diffuse consonant release spectrum signaling
a labial stop) can be instantiated as a collection of one-to-one
mappings.
However, when a particular sensory pattern must be classified
as a particular linguistic category and there are multiple possi-
ble interpretations, this constitutes a computational problem for
recognition. In this case (e.g., a formant pattern that could signal
either the vowel in BIT or BET) there is ambiguity about the
interpretation of the input without additional information. One
solution is that additional context or information could elimi-
nate some alternative interpretations as in talker normalization
(Nusbaum and Magnuson, 1997). But this leaves the problem
of determining the nature of the constraining information and
processing it, which is contingent on the ambiguity itself. This
suggests that there is no automatic or passive means of identifying
and using the constraining information. Thus an active mecha-
nism, which tests hypotheses about interpretations and tentatively
identifies sources of constraining information (Nusbaum and
Schwab, 1986), may be needed.
Given that there are multiple alternative interpretations for
a particular segment of speech signal, the nature of the infor-
mation needed to constrain the selection depends on the source
of variability that produced the one-to-many non-determinism.
Variations in speaking rate, or talker, or linguistic context or other
signal modifications are all potential sources of variability that are
regularly encountered by listeners. Whether the system uses artic-
ulatory or linguistic information as a constraint, the perceptual
system needs to flexibly use context as a guide in determining
the relevant properties needed for recognition (Nusbaum and
Schwab, 1986). The process of eliminating or weighing potential
interpretations could well involve demands on working mem-
ory. Additionally, there may be changes in attention, towards
more diagnostic patterns of information. Further, the system
may be required to adapt to new sources of lawful variability
in order to understand the context (cf. Elman and McClelland,
1986).
Generally speaking, these same kinds of mechanisms could
be implicated in higher levels of linguistic processing in spoken
language comprehension, although the neural implementation of
such mechanisms might well differ. A many-to-many mapping
problem extends to all levels of linguistic analysis in language
comprehension and can be observed between patterns at the
syllabic, lexical, prosodic and sentential level in speech and the
interpretations of those patterns as linguistic messages. This is
due to the fact that across linguistic contexts, speaker differences
(idiolect, dialect, etc.) and other contextual variations, there are
no patterns (acoustic, phonetic, syllabic, prosodic, lexical etc.) in
speech that have an invariant relationship to the interpretation of
those patterns. For this reason, it could be beneficial to consider
how these phenomena of acoustic perception, phonetic percep-
tion, syllabic perception, prosodic perception, lexical perception,
etc., are related computationally to one another and understand
the computational similarities among the mechanisms that may
subserve them (Marr, 1982). Given that such a mechanism needs
to flexibly respond to changes in context (and different kinds
of context—word or sentence or talker or speaking rate) and
constrain linguistic interpretations in context, suggests that the
mechanism for speech understanding needs to be plastic. In
other words, speech recognition should inherently demonstrate
learning.
LEARNING MECHANISMS IN SPEECH
While on its face this seems uncontroversial, theories of speech
perception have not traditionally incorporated learning although
some have evolved over time to do so (e.g., Shortlist-B, Hebb-
Trace). Indeed, there remains some disagreement about the plas-
ticity of speech processing in adults. One issue is how the long-
term memory structures that guide speech processing are modi-
fied to allow for this plasticity while at the same time maintain-
ing and protecting previously learned information from being
expunged. This is especially important as often newly acquired
information may represent irrelevant information to the system
in a long-term sense (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1988; Born and
Wilhelm, 2012).
To overcome this problem, researchers have proposed various
mechanistic accounts, and while there is no consensus amongst
them, a hallmark characteristic of these accounts is that learning
occurs in two stages. In the first stage, the memory system is able
to use fast learning temporary storage to achieve adaptability, and
in a subsequent stage, during an offline period such as sleep, this
information is consolidated into long-term memory structures if
the information is found to be germane (Marr, 1971; McClelland
et al., 1995; Ashby et al., 2007). While this is a general cognitive
approach to the formation of categories for recognition, this kind
of mechanism does not figure into general thinking about speech
recognition theories. The focus of these theories is less on the
formation of category representations and the need for plasticity
during recognition, than it is on the stability and structure of the
categories (e.g., phonemes) to be recognized. Theories of speech
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perception often avoid the plasticity-stability trade off problem
by proposing that the basic categories of speech are established
early in life, tuned by exposure, and subsequently only operate
as a passive detection system (e.g., Abbs and Sussman, 1971;
Fodor, 1983; McClelland and Elman, 1986; although see Mirman
et al., 2006b). According to these kinds of theories, early exposure
to a system of speech input has important effects on speech
processing.
Given the importance of early exposure for establishing the
phonological system, there is no controversy regarding the signif-
icance of linguistic experience in shaping an individual’s ability to
discriminate and identify speech sounds (Lisker and Abramson,
1964; Strange and Jenkins, 1978; Werker and Tees, 1984; Werker
and Polka, 1993). An often-used example of this is found in
how infants’ perceptual abilities change via exposure to their
native language. At birth, infants are able to discriminate a
wide range of speech sounds whether present or not in their
native language (Werker and Tees, 1984). However, as a result
of early linguistic exposure and experience, infants gain sen-
sitivity to phonetic contrasts to which they are exposed and
eventually lose sensitivity for phonetic contrasts that are not
experienced (Werker and Tees, 1983). Additionally, older children
continue to show developmental changes in perceptual sensi-
tivity to acoustic-phonetic patterns (e.g., Nittrouer and Miller,
1997; Nittrouer and Lowenstein, 2007) suggesting that learning
a phonology is not simply a matter of acquiring a simple set
of mappings between the acoustic patterns of speech and the
sound categories of language. Further, this perceptual learning
does not end with childhood as it is quite clear that even
adult listeners are capable of learning new phonetic distinctions
not present in their native language (Werker and Logan, 1985;
Pisoni et al., 1994; Francis and Nusbaum, 2002; Lim and Holt,
2011).
A large body of research has now established that adult
listeners can learn a variety of new phonetic contrasts from
outside their native language. Adults are able to learn to split
a single native phonological category into two functional cate-
gories, such as Thai pre-voicing when learned by native English
speakers (Pisoni et al., 1982) as well as to learn completely
novel categories such as Zulu clicks for English speakers (Best
et al., 1988). Moreover, adults possess the ability to completely
change the way they attend to cues, for example Japanese
speakers are able to learn the English /r/-/l/ distinction, a con-
trast not present in their native language (e.g., Logan et al.,
1991; Yamada and Tohkura, 1992; Lively et al., 1993). While
learning is limited, Francis and Nusbaum (2002) demonstrated
that given appropriate feedback, listeners can learn to direct
perceptual attention to acoustic cues that were not previously
used to form phonetic distinctions in their native language. In
their study, learning new categories was manifest as a change
in the structure of the acoustic-phonetic space wherein indi-
viduals shifted from the use of one perceptual dimension
(e.g., voicing) to a complex of two perceptual dimensions,
enabling native English speakers to correctly perceive Korean
stops after training. How can we describe this change? What is
the mechanism by which this change in perceptual processing
occurs?
From one perspective this change in perceptual processing
can be described as a shift in attention (Nusbaum and Schwab,
1986). Auditory receptive fields may be tuned (e.g., Cruikshank
and Weinberger, 1996; Weinberger, 1998; Wehr and Zador, 2003;
Znamenskiy and Zador, 2013) or reshaped as a function of appro-
priate feedback (cf. Moran and Desimone, 1985) or context (Asari
and Zador, 2009). This is consistent with theories of category
learning (e.g., Schyns et al., 1998) in which category structures
are related to corresponding sensory patterns (Francis et al., 2007,
2008). From another perspective this adaptation process could
be described as the same kind of cue weighting observed in the
development of phonetic categories (e.g., Nittrouer and Miller,
1997; Nittrouer and Lowenstein, 2007). Yamada and Tohkura
(1992) describe native Japanese listeners as typically directing
attention to acoustic properties of /r/-/l/ stimuli that are not
the dimensions used by English speakers, and as such are not
able to discriminate between these categories. This misdirection
of attention occurs because these patterns are not differentiated
functionally in Japanese as they are in English. For this reason,
Japanese and English listeners distribute attention in the acoustic
pattern space for /r/ and /l/ differently as determined by the
phonological function of this space in their respective languages.
Perceptual learning of these categories by Japanese listeners sug-
gests a shift of attention to the English phonetically relevant
cues.
This idea of shifting attention among possible cues to cat-
egories is part and parcel of a number of theories of catego-
rization that are not at all specific to speech perception (e.g.,
Gibson, 1969; Nosofsky, 1986; Goldstone, 1998; Goldstone and
Kersten, 2003) but have been incorporated into some theories
of speech perception (e.g., Jusczyk, 1993). Recently, McMurray
and Jongman (2011) proposed the C-Cure model of phoneme
classification in which the relative importance of cues varies with
context, although the model does not specify a mechanism by
which such plasticity is implemented neurally.
One issue to consider in examining the paradigm of train-
ing non-native phonetic contrasts is that adult listeners bring
an intact and complete native phonological system to bear on
any new phonetic category-learning problem. This pre-existing
phonological knowledge about the sound structure of a native
language operates as a critical mass of an acoustic-phonetic sys-
tem with which a new category likely does not mesh (Nusbaum
and Lee, 1992). New contrasts can re-parse the acoustic cue
space into categories that are at odds with the native system,
can be based on cues that are entirely outside the system (e.g.,
clicks), or can completely remap native acoustic properties into
new categories (see Best et al., 2001). In all these cases however
listeners need to not only learn the pattern information that cor-
responds to these categories, but additionally learn the categories
themselves. In most studies participants do not actually learn
a completely new phonological system that exhibits an internal
structure capable of supporting the acquisition of new categories,
but instead learn isolated contrasts that are not part of their native
system. Thus, learning non-native phonological contrasts requires
individuals to learn both new category structures, as well as how
to direct attention to the acoustic cues that define those categories
without colliding with extant categories.
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How do listeners accommodate the signal changes encoun-
tered on a daily basis in listening to speech? Echo and reverber-
ation can distort speech. Talkers speak while eating. Accents can
change the acoustic to percept mappings based on the articulatory
phonetics of a native language. While some of the distortions
in signals can probably be handled by some simple filtering
in the auditory system, more complex signal changes that are
systematic cannot be handled in this way. The use of filtering as
a solution for speech signal distortion assumes a model of speech
perception whereby a set of acoustic-phonetic representations
(whether talker-specific or not) are obscured by some distortion
and that some simple acoustic transform (like amplification or
time-dilation) is used to restore the signal.
An alternative to this view was proposed by Elman and
McClelland (1986). They suggested that the listener can use
systematicity in distortions of acoustic patterns as information
about the sources of variability that affected the signal in the
conditions under which the speech was produced. This idea, that
systematic variability in acoustic patterns of phonetic categories
provides information about the intended phonetic message,
suggests that even without learning new phonetic categories
or contrasts, learning the sources and structure of acoustic-
phonetic variability may be a fundamental aspect of speech per-
ception. Nygaard et al. (1994) and Nygaard and Pisoni (1998)
demonstrated that listeners learning the speech of talkers using
the same phonetic categories as the listeners show significant
improvements in speech recognition. Additionally, Dorman et al.
(1977) elegantly demonstrated that different talkers speaking
the same language can use different acoustic cues to make
the same phonetic contrasts. In these situations, in order to
recognize speech, listeners must learn to direct attention to
the specific cues for a particular talker in order to ameliorate
speech perception. In essence, this suggests that learning may
be an intrinsic part of speech perception rather than some-
thing added on. Phonetic categories must remain plastic even
in adults in order to flexibly respond to the changing demands
of the lack of invariance problem across talkers and contexts of
speaking.
One way of investigating those aspects of learning that are
specific to directing attention to appropriate and meaningful
acoustic cues without additionally having individuals learn new
phonetic categories or a new phonological system, is to exam-
ine how listeners adapt to synthetic speech that uses their
own native phonological categories. Synthetic speech generated
by rule is “defective” in relation to natural speech in that it
oversimplifies the acoustic pattern structure (e.g., fewer cues,
less cue covariation) and some cues may actually be mislead-
ing (Nusbaum and Pisoni, 1985). Learning synthetic speech
requires listeners to learn how acoustic information, produced
by a particular talker, is used to define the speech categories
the listener already possesses. In order to do this, listeners need
to make use of degraded, sparse and often misleading acous-
tic information, which contributes to the poor intelligibility
of synthesized speech. Given that such cues are not available
to awareness, and that most of such learning is presumed to
occur early in life, it seems difficult to understand that adult
listeners could even do this. In fact, it is this ability to rapidly
learn synthetic speech that lead Nusbaum and Schwab (1986)
to conclude that speech must be guided by active control
processes.
GENERALIZATION LEARNING
In a study reported by Schwab et al. (1985), listeners were trained
on synthetic speech for 8 days with feedback and tested before
and after training. Before training, recognition was about 20%
correct, but improved after training to about 70% correct. More
impressively this learning occurred even though listeners were
never trained or tested on the same words twice, meaning that
individuals had not just explicitly learned what they were trained
on, but instead gained generalized knowledge about the synthetic
speech. Additionally, Schwab et al. (1985) demonstrated that
listeners are able to substantially retain this generalized knowledge
without any additionally exposure to the synthesizer, as listeners
showed similar performance 6 months later. This suggests that
even without hearing the same words over and over again, lis-
teners were able to change the way they used acoustic cues at a
sublexical level. In turn, listeners used this sublexical information
to drive recognition of these cues in completely novel lexical
contexts. This is far different from simply memorizing the specific
and complete acoustic patterns of particular words, but instead
could reflect a kind of procedural knowledge of how to direct
attention to the speech of the synthetic talker.
This initial study demonstrated clear generalization beyond
the specific patterns heard during training. However on its own
it gives little insight into the way such generalization emerges.
In a subsequent study, Greenspan et al. (1988) expanded on this
and examined the ability of adult listeners to generalize from
various training regimes asking the question of how acoustic-
phonetic variability affects generalization of speech learning. Lis-
teners were either given training on repeated words or novel
words, and when listeners memorize specific acoustic patterns
of spoken words, there is very good recognition performance
for those words. However this does not afford the same level
of perceptual generalization that is produced by highly variable
training experiences. This is akin to the benefits of training
variability seen in motor learning in which generalization of
a motor behavior is desired (e.g., Lametti and Ostry, 2010;
Mattar and Ostry, 2010; Coelho et al., 2012). Given that train-
ing set variability modulates the type of learning, adult per-
ceptual learning of spoken words cannot be seen as simply a
rote process. Moreover, even from a small amount of repeated
and focused rote training there is some reliable generalization
indicating that listeners can use even restricted variability in
learning to go beyond the training examples (Greenspan et al.,
1988). Listeners may infer this generalized information from the
training stimuli, or they might develop a more abstract repre-
sentation of sound patterns based on variability in experience
and apply this knowledge to novel speech patterns in novel
contexts.
Synthetic speech, produced by rule, as learned in those stud-
ies, represents a complete model of speech production from
orthographic-to-phonetic-to-acoustic generation. The speech
that is produced is recognizable but it is artificial. Thus learning
of this kind of speech is tantamount to learning a strange idiolect
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of speech that contains acoustic-phonetic errors, missing acoustic
cues and does not possess correct cue covariation. However if
listeners learn this speech by gleaning the new acoustic-phonetic
properties for this kind of talker, it makes sense that listeners
should be able to learn other kinds of speech as well. This is
particularly true if learning is accomplished by changing the way
listeners attend to the acoustic properties of speech by focusing
on the acoustic properties that are most phonetically diagnostic.
And indeed, beyond being able to learn synthesized speech in
this fashion, adults have been shown to quickly adapt to a variety
of other forms of distorted speech where the distortions initially
cause a reduction in intelligibility, such as simulated cochlear
implant speech (Shannon et al., 1995), spectrally shifted speech
(Rosen et al., 1999) as well as foreign-accented speech (Weil,
2001; Clarke and Garrett, 2004; Bradlow and Bent, 2008; Sidaras
et al., 2009). In these studies, listeners learn speech that has
been produced naturally with coarticulation and the full range of
acoustic-phonetic structure, however, the speech signal deviates
from listener expectations due to a transform of some kind,
either through signal processing or through phonological changes
in speaking. Different signal transforms may distort or mask
certain cues and phonological changes may change cue complex
structure. These distortions are unlike synthetic speech however,
as these transforms tend to be uniform across the phonological
inventory. This would provide listeners with a kind of lawful
variability (as described by Elman and McClelland, 1986) that
can be exploited as an aid to recognition. Given that in all these
speech distortions listeners showed a robust ability to apply what
they learned during training to novel words and contexts, learning
does not appear to be simply understanding what specific acoustic
cues mean, but rather understanding what acoustic cues are most
relevant for a given source and how to attend to them (Nusbaum
and Lee, 1992; Nygaard et al., 1994; Francis and Nusbaum,
2002).
How do individuals come to learn what acoustic cues are most
diagnostic for a given source? One possibility is that acoustic
cues are mapped to their perceptual counterparts in an unguided
fashion, that is, without regard for the systematicity of native
acoustic-phonetic experience. Conversely, individuals may rely on
their native phonological system to guide the learning process.
In order to examine if perceptual learning is influenced by an
individual’s native phonological experience, Davis et al. (2005)
examined if perceptual learning was more robust when individ-
uals were trained on words versus non-words. Their rationale
was that if training on words led to better perceptual learning
than non-words, then one could conclude that the acoustic to
phonetic remapping process is guided or structured by informa-
tion at the lexical level. Indeed, Davis et al. (2005) showed that
training was more effective when the stimuli consisted of words
than non-words, indicating that information at the lexical level
allows individuals to use their knowledge about how sounds are
related in their native phonological system to guide the perceptual
learning process. The idea that perceptual learning in speech is
driven to some extent by lexical knowledge is consistent with both
autonomous (e.g., Shortlist: Norris, 1994; Merge: Norris et al.,
2000; Shortlist B: Norris and McQueen, 2008) and interactive
(e.g., TRACE: McClelland and Elman, 1986; Hebb-Trace: Mirman
et al., 2006a) models of speech perception (although whether
learning can successfully operate in these models is a different
question altogether). A subsequent study by Dahan and Mead
(2010) examined the structure of the learning process further by
asking how more localized or recent experience, such as the spe-
cific contrasts present during training, may organize and deter-
mine subsequent learning. To do this, Dahan and Mead (2010)
systematically controlled the relationship between training and
test stimuli as individuals learned to understand noise vocoded
speech. Their logic was that if localized or recent experience
organizes learning, then the phonemic contrasts present during
training may provide such a structure, such that phonemes will
be better recognized at test if they had been heard in a similar
syllable position or vocalic context during training than if they
had been heard in a different context. Their results showed that
individuals’ learning was directly related to the local phonetic
context of training, as consonants were recognized better if they
had been heard in a similar syllable position or vocalic context
during training than if they had been heard in a dissimilar
context.
This is unsurprising as the acoustic realization of a given con-
sonant can be dramatically different depending on the position
of a consonant within a syllable (Sproat and Fujimura, 1993;
Browman and Goldstein, 1995). Further, there are coarticula-
tion effects such that the acoustic characteristics of a conso-
nant are heavily modified by the phonetic context in which it
occurs (Liberman et al., 1954; Warren and Marslen-Wilson, 1987;
Whalen, 1991). In this sense, the acoustic properties of speech
are not dissociable beads on a string and as such, the linguistic
context of a phoneme is very much apart of the acoustic definition
of a phoneme. While experience during training does appear to
be the major factor underlying learning, individuals also show
transfer of learning to phonemes that were not presented during
training provided that were perceptually similar to the phonemes
that were present. This is consistent with a substantial body of
speech research using perceptual contrast procedures that showed
that there are representations for speech sounds both at the level
of the allophonic or acoustic-phonetic specification as well as at
a more abstract phonological level (e.g., Sawusch and Jusczyk,
1981; Sawusch and Nusbaum, 1983; Hasson et al., 2007). Taken
together both the Dahan and Mead (2010) and the Davis et al.
(2005) studies provide clear evidence that previous experience,
such as the knowledge of one’s native phonological system, as well
as more localized experience relating to the occurrence of specific
contrasts in a training set help to guide the perceptual learning
process.
What is the nature of the mechanism underlying the per-
ceptual learning process that leads to better recognition after
training? To examine if training shifts attention to phonetically
meaningful cues and away from misleading cues, Francis et al.
(2000), trained listeners on CV syllables containing /b/, /d/, and
or /g/ cued by a chimeric acoustic structure containing either
consistent or conflicting properties. The CV syllables were con-
structed such that the place of articulation was specified by the
spectrum of the burst (Blumstein and Stevens, 1980) as well as
by the formant transitions from the consonant to the vowel (e.g.,
Liberman et al., 1967). However, for some chimeric CVs, the
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spectrum of the burst indicated a different place of articulation
than the transition cue. Previously Walley and Carrell (1983) had
demonstrated that listeners tend to identify place of articulation
based on transition information rather than the spectrum of the
burst when these cues conflict. And of course listeners never
consciously hear either of these as separate signals—they simply
hear a consonant at a particular place of articulation. Given that
listeners cannot identify the acoustic cues that define the place
of articulation consciously and only experience the categorical
identity of the consonant itself, it seems hard to understand how
attention can be directed towards these cues.
Francis et al. (2000) trained listeners to recognize the chimeric
speech in their experiment by providing feedback about the
consonant identity that was either consistent with the burst cues
or the transition cues depending on the training group. For the
burst-trained group, when listeners heard a CV and identified it as
a B, D, or G, they would receive feedback following identification.
For a chimeric consonant cued with a labial burst and an alveolar
transition pattern (combined), whether listeners identified the
consonant as B (correct for the burst-trained group) or another
place, after identification they would hear the CV again and see
feedback printed identifying the consonant as B. In other words,
burst-trained listeners would get feedback during training con-
sistent with the spectrum of the burst whereas transition-trained
listeners would get feedback consistent with the pattern of the
transitions. The results showed that cue-based feedback shifted
identification performance over training trials such that listeners
were able to learn to use the specific cue (either transition based
or spectral burst based) that was consistent with the feedback and
generalized to novel stimuli. This kind of learning research (also
Francis and Nusbaum, 2002; Francis et al., 2007) suggests shifting
attention may serve to restructure perceptual space as a result of
appropriate feedback.
Although the standard view of speech perception is one that
does not explicitly incorporate learning mechanisms, this is in
part because of a very static view of speech recognition whereby
stimulus patterns are simply mapped onto phonological cate-
gories during recognition, and learning may occur, if it does, after-
wards. These theories never directly solve the lack of invariance
problem, given a fundamentally deterministic computational pro-
cess in which input states (whether acoustic or articulatory)
must correspond uniquely to perceptual states (phonological
categories). An alternative is to consider speech perception is
an active process in which alternative phonetic interpretations
are activated, each corresponding to a particular input pattern
from speech (Nusbaum and Schwab, 1986). These alternatives
must then be reduced to the recognized form, possibly by testing
these alternatives as hypotheses shifting attention among different
aspects of context, knowledge, or cues to find the best constraints.
This view suggests that there should be an increase in cognitive
load on the listener until a shift of attention to more diagnostic
information occurs when there is a one-to-many mapping, either
due to speech rate variability (Francis and Nusbaum, 1996) or
talker variability (Nusbaum and Morin, 1992). Variation in talker
or speaking rate or distortion can change the way attention
is directed at a particular source of speech, shifting attention
towards the most diagnostic cues and away from the misleading
cues. This suggests a direct link between attention and learning,
with the load on working memory reflecting the uncertainty of
recognition given a one-to-many mapping of acoustic cues to
phonemes.
If a one-to-many mapping increases the load on working
memory because of active alternative phonetic hypotheses, and
learning shifts attention to more phonetically diagnostic cues,
learning to perceive synthetic speech should reduce the load
on working memory. In this sense, focusing attention on the
diagnostic cues should reduce the number of phonetic hypothe-
ses. Moreover, this should not simply be a result of improved
intelligibility, as increasing speech intelligibility without training
should not have the same effect. To investigate this, Francis
and Nusbaum (2009) used a speeded spoken target monitoring
procedure and manipulated memory load to see if the effect of
such a manipulation would change as a function of learning
synthetic speech. The logic of the study was that varying a working
memory load explicitly should affect recognition speed if working
memory plays a role in recognition. Before training, working
memory should have a higher load than after training, suggesting
that there should be an interaction between working memory load
and the training in recognition time (cf. Navon, 1984). When
the extrinsic working memory load (to the speech task) is high,
there should be less working memory available for recognition
but when the extrinsic load is low there should be more working
memory available. This suggests that training should interact
with working memory load by showing a larger improvement of
recognition time in the low load case than in the high load case. Of
course if speech is directly mapped from acoustic cues to phonetic
categories, there is no reason to predict a working memory load
effect and certainly no interaction with training. The results
demonstrated however a clear interaction of working memory
load and training as predicted by the use of working memory and
attention (Francis and Nusbaum, 2009). These results support
the view that training reorganizes perception, shifting attention
to more informative cues allowing working memory to be used
more efficiently and effectively. This has implications for older
adults who suffer from hearing loss. If individuals recruit addi-
tional cognitive and perceptual resources to ameliorate sensory
deficits, then they will lack the necessary resources to cope
with situations where there is an increase in talker or speaking
rate variability. In fact, Peelle and Wingfield (2005) report that
while older adults can adapt to time-compressed speech, they
are unable to transfer learning on one speech rate to a second
speech rate.
MECHANISMS OF MEMORY
Changes in the allocation of attention and the demands on
working memory are likely related to substantial modifications
of category structures in long term memory (Nosofsky, 1986;
Ashby and Maddox, 2005). Effects of training on synthetic speech
have been shown to be retained for 6 months suggesting that
categorization structures in long-term memory that guide per-
ception have been altered (Schwab et al., 1985). How are these
category structures that guide perception (Schyns et al., 1998)
modified? McClelland and Rumelhart (1985) and McClelland
et al. (1995) have proposed a neural cognitive model that explains
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how individuals are able to adapt to new information in their
environment. According to their model, specific memory traces
are initially encoded during learning via a fast-learning hip-
pocampal based memory system. Then, via a process of repeated
reactivation or rehearsal, memory traces are strengthened and
ultimately represented solely in the neocortical memory system.
One of the main benefits of McClelland’s model is that it explains
how previously learned information is protected against newly
acquired information that may potentially be irrelevant for long-
term use. In their model, the hippocampal memory system acts
as temporary storage where fast-learning occurs, while the neo-
cortical memory system, which houses the long-term memory
category that guide perception, are modified later, presumably
offline when there are no encoding demands on the system. This
allows the representational system to remain adaptive without
the loss of representational stability as only memory traces that
are significant to the system will be strengthened and rehearsed.
This kind of two-stage model of memory is consistent with a
large body of memory data, although the role of the hippocampus
outlined in this model is somewhat different than other theories
of memory (e.g., Eichenbaum et al., 1992; Wood et al., 1999,
2000).
Ashby et al. (2007) have also posited a two-stage model for
category learning, but implementing the basis for the two stages,
as well as their function in category formation, very differently.
They suggest that the basal ganglia and the thalamus, rather than
the hippocampus, together mediate the development of more
permanent neorcortical memory structures. In their model, the
striatum, globus pallidus, and thalamus comprise the fast learning
temporary memory system. This subcortical circuit is has greater
adaptability due to the dopamine-mediated learning that can
occur in the basal ganglia, while representations in the neocortical
circuit are much more slow to change as they rely solely on
Hebbian learning to be amended.
McClelland’s neural model relies on the hippocampal mem-
ory system as a substrate to support the development of the
long-term memory structures in neocortex. Thus hippocampal
memories are comprised of recent specific experiences or rote
memory traces that are encoded during training. In this sense,
the hippocampal memory circuit supports the longer-term reor-
ganization or consolidation of declarative memories. In contrast,
in the basal ganglia based model of learning put forth by Ashby
a striatum to thalamus circuit provides the foundation for the
development of consolidation in cortical circuits. This is seen as
a progression from a slow based hypothesis-testing system to a
faster processing, implicit memory system. Therefore the striatum
to thalamus circuit mediates the reorganization or consolidation
of procedural memories. To show evidence for this, Ashby et al.
(2007) use information-integration categorization tasks, where
the rules that govern the categories that are to be learned are
not easily verbalized. In these tasks, the learner is required to
integrate information from two or more dimensions at some
pre-decisional stage. The logic is that information-integration
tasks use the dopamine-mediated reward signals afforded by the
basal ganglia. In contrast, in rule-based categorization tasks the
categories to be learned are explicitly verbally defined, and thus
rely on conscious hypothesis generation and testing. As such,
this explicit category learning is thought (Ashby et al., 2007)
to be mediated by the anterior cingulate and the prefrontal
cortex. For this reason, demands on working memory and exec-
utive attention are hypothesized to affect only the learning of
explicit based categories and not implicit procedural categories,
as working memory and executive attention are processes that
are largely governed by the prefrontal cortex (Kane and Engle,
2000).
The differences between McClelland and Ashby’s models
appear to be related in part to the distinction between declarative
versus procedural learning. While it is certainly reasonable to
divide memory in this way, it is unarguable that both types of
memories involve encoding and consolidation. While it may be
the case that the declarative and procedural memories operate
through different systems, this seems unlikely given that there
are data suggesting the role of the hippocampus in procedural
learning (Chun and Phelps, 1999) even when this is not a ver-
balizable and an explicit rule-based learning process. Elements of
the theoretic assumptions of both models seem open to criticism
in one way or another. But both models make explicit a process by
which rapidly learned, short-term memories can be consolidated
into more stable forms. Therefore it is important to consider such
models in trying to understand the process by which stable mem-
ories are formed as the foundation of phonological knowledge in
speech perception.
As noted previously, speech appears to have separate repre-
sentations for the specific acoustic patterns of speech as well as
more abstract phonological categories (e.g., Sawusch and Jusczyk,
1981; Sawusch and Nusbaum, 1983; Hasson et al., 2007). Learning
appears to occur at both levels as well (Greenspan et al., 1988)
suggesting the importance of memory theory differentiating both
short-term and long-term representations as well as stimulus spe-
cific traces and more abstract representations. It is widely accepted
that any experience may be represented across various levels of
abstraction. For example, while only specific memory traces are
encoded for many connectionist models (e.g., McClelland and
Rumelhart’s, 1985 model), various levels of abstraction can be
achieved in the retrieval process depending on the goals of the
task. This is in fact the foundation of Goldinger’s (1998) echoic
trace model based on Hintzman’s (1984) MINERVA2 model. Spe-
cific auditory representations of the acoustic pattern of a spoken
word are encoded into memory and abstractions are derived
during the retrieval process using working memory.
In contrast to these trace-abstraction models is another pos-
sibility wherein stimulus-specific and abstracted information are
both stored in memory. For example an acoustic pattern descrip-
tion of speech as well as a phonological category description
are represented separately in memory in the TRACE model
(McClelland and Elman, 1986; Mirman et al., 2006a). In this
respect then, the acoustic patterns of speech—as particular rep-
resentations of a specific perceptual experience—are very much
like the echoic traces of Goldinger’s model. However where
Goldinger argued against forming and storing abstract repre-
sentations, others have suggested that such abstractions may in
fact be formed and stored in the lexicon (see Luce et al., 2003;
Ju and Luce, 2006). Indeed, Hasson et al. (2007) demonstrated
repetition suppression effects specific to the abstract phonological
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representation of speech sounds given that the effect held between
an illusory syllable /ta/ and a physical syllable /ta/ based on a net-
work spanning sensory and motor cortex. Such abstractions are
unlikely to simply be an assemblage of prior sensory traces given
that the brain areas involved are not the same as those typically
activated in recognizing those traces. In this way, memory can
be theoretically distinguished into rote representational structures
that consist of specific experienced items or more generalized
structures that consist of abstracted information. Rote memories
are advantageous for precise recall of already experienced stimuli
where as generalized memory would favor performance for a
larger span of stimuli in a novel context.
This distinction between rote and generalized representations
cuts across the distinction between procedural and declarative
memory. Both declarative and procedural memories may be
encoded as either rote or generalized memory representational
structures. For example, an individual may be trained to press
a specific sequence of keys on a keyboard. This would lead to
the development of a rote representational memory structure,
allowing the individual to improve his or her performance on
that specific sequence. Alternatively, the individual may be trained
to press several sequences of keys on a keyboard. This difference
in training would lead to the development of a more generalized
memory structure, resulting in better performance both experi-
enced and novel key sequences. Similarly declarative memories
may be encoded as either rote or generalized structures as a given
declarative memory structures may consist of either the specific
experienced instances of a particular stimulus, as in a typical
episodic memory experiment, or the “gist” of the experienced
instances as in the formation of semantic memories or possibly
illusory memories based on associations (see Gallo, 2006).
The argument about the distinction between rote and gener-
alized or abstracted memory representations becomes important
when considering the way in which memories become stabilized
through consolidation. In particular, for perceptual learning of
speech, two aspects are critical. First, given the generativity of
language and the context-sensitive nature of acoustic-phonetics,
listeners are not going to hear the same utterances again and again
and further, the acoustic pattern variation in repeated utterances,
even if they occurred, would be immense due to changes in
linguistic context, speaking rate, and talkers. As such, this makes
the use of rote-memorization of acoustic patterns untenable as
a speech recognition system. Listeners either have to be able
to generalize in real time from prior auditory experiences (as
suggested by Goldinger, 1998) or there must be more abstract
representations that go beyond the specific sensory patterns of
any particular utterance (as suggested by Hasson et al., 2007).
This is unlikely due to the second consideration, which is that
any generalizations in speech perception must be made quickly
and remain stable to be useful. As demonstrated by Greenspan
et al. (1988) even learning a small number of spoken words from
a particular speech synthesizer will produce some generalization
to novel utterances, although increasing the variability in experi-
ences will increase the amount of generalization.
The separation between rote and generalization learning
is further demonstrated by the effects of sleep consolidation
on the stability of memories. In the original synthetic speech
learning study by Schwab et al. (1985), listeners demonstrated
significant learning in spite of never hearing the same words
twice. Moreover this generalization learning lasted for roughly
6 months without subsequent training. This demonstrates that
high variability in training examples with appropriate feedback
can produce large improvements in generalized performance
that can remain robust and stable for a long time. Fenn et al.
(2003) demonstrated that this stability is a consequence of sleep
consolidation of learning. In addition, when some forgetting
takes place over the course of a day following learning, sleep
restores the forgotten memories. It appears that this may well
be due to sleep separately consolidating both the initial learn-
ing as well as any interference that occurs following learning
(Brawn et al., 2013). Furthermore, Fenn and Hambrick (2012)
have demonstrated that the effectiveness of sleep consolidation
is related to individual differences in working memory such that
higher levels of working memory performance are related to
better consolidation. This links the effectiveness of sleep con-
solidation to a mechanism closely tied to active processing in
speech perception. Most recently though, Fenn et al. (2013)
found that sleep operates differently for rote and generalized
learning.
These findings have several implications for therapy with
listeners with hearing loss. First, training and testing should be
separated by a period of sleep in order to measure the amount
of learning that is stable. Second, although variability in training
experiences seems to produce slower rates of learning, it produces
greater generalization learning. Third, measurements of working
memory can give a rough guide to the relative effectiveness of
sleep consolidation thereby indicating how at risk learning may be
to interference and suggesting that training may need to be more
prolonged for people with lower working memory capacity.
CONCLUSION
Theories of speech perception have often conceptualized the
earliest stages of auditory processing of speech to be indepen-
dent of higher level linguistic and cognitive processing. In many
respects this kind of approach (e.g., in Shortlist B) treats the
phonetic processing of auditory inputs as a passive system in
which acoustic patterns are directly mapped onto phonetic fea-
tures or categories, albeit with some distribution of performance.
Such theories treat the distributions of input phonetic properties
as relatively immutable. However, our argument is that even
early auditory processes are subject to descending attentional
control and active processing. Just as echolocation in the bat is
explained by a cortofugal system in which cortical and subcor-
tical structures are viewed as processing cotemporaneously and
interactively (Suga, 2008), the idea that descending projects from
cortex to thalamus and to the cochlea provide a neural substrate
for cortical tuning of auditory inputs. Descending projections
from the lateral olivary complex to the inner hair cells and from
the medial olivary complex to the outer hair cells provide a
potential basis for changing auditory encoding in real time as
a result of shifts of attention. This kind of mechanism could
support the kinds of effects seen in increased auditory brainstem
response fidelity to acoustic input following training (Strait et al.,
2010).
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Understanding speech perception as an active process suggests
that learning or plasticity is not simply a higher-level process
grafted on top of word recognition. Rather the kinds of
mechanisms involved in shifting attention to relevant acoustic
cues for phoneme perception (e.g., Francis et al., 2000, 2007)
are needed for tuning speech perception to the specific vocal
characteristics of a new speaker or to cope with distortion of
speech or noise in the environment. Given that such plasticity is
linked to attention and working memory, we argue that speech
perception is inherently a cognitive process, even in terms of the
involvement of sensory encoding. This has implications for reme-
diation of hearing loss either with augmentative aids or therapy.
First, understanding the cognitive abilities (e.g., working memory
capacity, attention control etc.) may provide guidance on how to
design a training program by providing different kinds of sensory
cues that are correlated or reducing the cognitive demands of
training. Second, increasing sensory variability within the limits
of individual tolerance should be part of a therapeutic program.
Third, understanding the sleep practice of participants using sleep
logs, record of drug and alcohol consumption, and exercise are
important to the consolidation of learning. If speech perception
is continuously plastic but there are limitations based on prior
experiences and cognitive capacities, this shapes the basic nature
of remediation of hearing loss in a number of different ways.
Finally, we would note that there is a dissociation among the
three classes of models that are relevant to understanding speech
perception as an active process. Although cognitive models of
spoken word processing (e.g., Cohort, TRACE, and Shortlist)
have been developed to include some plasticity and to account
for different patterns of the influence of lexical knowledge, even
the most recent versions (e.g., Distributed Cohort, Hebb-TRACE,
and Shortlist B) do not specifically account for active processing
of auditory input. It is true that some models have attempted
to account for active processing below the level of phonemes
(e.g., TRACE I: Elman and McClelland, 1986; McClelland et al.,
2006), these models not been related or compared systematically
to the kinds of models emerging from neuroscience research. For
example, Friederici (2012) and Rauschecker and Scott (2009) and
Hickok and Poeppel (2007) have all proposed neurally plausible
models largely around the idea of dorsal and ventral processing
streams. Although these models differ in details, in principle the
model proposed by Friederici (2012) and Rauschecker and Scott
(2009) have more extensive feedback mechanisms to support
active processing of sensory input. These models are constructed
in a neuroanatomical vernacular rather than the cognitive vernac-
ular (even the Hebb-TRACE is still largely a cognitive model) of
the others. But both sets of models are notable for two important
omissions.
First, while the cognitive models mention learning and even
model it, and the neural models refer to some aspects of learn-
ing, these models do not relate to the two-process learning
models (e.g., complementary learning systems (CLS; McClelland
et al., 1995; Ashby and Maddox, 2005; Ashby et al., 2007)).
Although CLS focuses on episodic memory and Ashby et al.
(2007) focus on category learning, two process models involving
either hippocampus, basal ganglia, or cerebellum as a fast asso-
ciator and cortico-cortical connections as a slower more robust
learning system, have garnered substantial interest and research
support. Yet learning in the models of speech recognition has
yet to seriously address the neural bases of learning and memory
except descriptively.
This points to a second important omission. All of the speech
recognition models are cortical models. There is no serious con-
sideration to the role of the thalamus, amygdala, hippocampus,
cerebellum or other structures in these models. In taking a
corticocentric view (see Parvizi, 2009), these models exhibit an
unrealistic myopia about neural explanations of speech percep-
tion. Research by Kraus et al. (Wong et al., 2007; Song et al.,
2008) demonstrates that there are measurable effects of training
and experience on speech processing in the auditory brainstem.
This is consistent with an active model of speech perception in
which attention and experience shape the earliest levels of sensory
encoding of speech. Although current data do not exist to support
online changes in this kind of processing, this is exactly the kind of
prediction an active model of speech perception would make but
is entirely unexpected from any of the current models of speech
perception.
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